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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY EMPLOYEES, 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL 72, 
Charging Party, 
- and -
NEW YORK STATE THRUWAY AUTHORITY, CASE NO. U-27510 
Respondent. 
KEVIN C. CLOR, GENERAL COUNSEL, for Charging Party 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the New York State 
Thruway Employees, Teamsters Local 72 (Local 72) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on an improper practice 
charge filed by Local 72. As amended, Local 72 alleges in the charge that the New 
York State Thruway Authority (Authority) violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' 
Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally transferred bargaining unit work in the fall 
of 2006. 
Following the Director's initial review of the charge, as mandated by §204.2 of 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), the Director informed Local 72 that its April 12, 
2007 charge was deficient by failing to identify the date(s) of the occurrence of the 
improper practice and because parties cannot agree to toll the four-month period for the 
filing of a charge.1 Thereafter, Local 72 filed an amended charge. Following a review of 
1
 Rules, §204.1(a)(1). 
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the amended charge, the Director issued a decision dismissing the charge, as 
amended, on the grounds that it was untimely pursuant to §204.1(a)(1) of the Rules.2 
EXCEPTIONS 
Local 72 filed two exceptions to the Director's dismissal of the charge. 
In its first exception, Local 72 acknowledges that it learned that private 
contractors-had been-assignedJoJill potholes.-woricpreviousLyLp_erfarme.d-by_u.nit 
members, in "October or November 2006." However, it asserts that it was unable to 
confirm that the type of work being performed by the contractors was exclusive 
bargaining unit work until March 10, 2007. 
In its second exception, Local 72 asserts that the four-month filing period had 
been tolled by an agreement between the Local 72 and the Authority during settlement 
discussions that commenced in November 2006. Under this agreement, the parties had 
purportedly agreed to extend the filing date of any improper practice charge until four 
months after settlement discussions had ended. 
The Authority has not filed a response to the exceptions. 
Based on our review of the record and our consideration of Local 72's 
exceptions, we affirm the decision of the Director dismissing the charge as untimely 
under §204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules. 
DISCUSSION 
Local 72 admits to having knowledge of the private contractors performing 
pothole filling over four months prior to filing the charge. It contends, however, that the 
time for the filing of a charge regarding the unilateral transfer of unit work commences 
240PERB H4533(2007). 
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only after an employee organization has completed an investigation to determine 
whether the work that was contracted out was exclusive bargaining unit work. 
We disagree. 
In determining the commencement of the four-month filing period for an improper 
practice charge alleging a §209.1-a (d) violation, we consider when the employee 
organization-had-aGtual-orGonstruGtive knowledge-of-the-aGt-or-aGts-that-form-the-basis-
forthe charge.3 In the present case, Local 72, by its own admission, had such 
knowledge over four months prior to filing the charge. As the Director correctly noted, 
there is no claim that the pothole filling was performed by the contractors in secret. 
Even if the Authority delayed in providing copies of the contracts during the 
settlement discussions, as alleged by Local 72 in its exceptions, such a delay did not 
preclude Local 72 from ascertaining on its own whether the work being performed by 
the contractors constituted exclusive bargaining unit work. 
In its second exception, Local 72 contends that the Board should honor the 
parties' purported agreement to toll the commencement of the filing period under 
§204.1 (a)(1) of the Rules. It is well-established that the time in which to file an improper 
practice charge is not tolled through negotiations between the parties or by the 
pendency of a related grievance.4 Neither the Act nor the Rules grants parties the right 
to modify the filing period. Adoption of a procedure permitting the tolling of the filing 
period would eviscerate the uniformity created by a fixed limitation period. 
3
 ntoalir \fal\a\, r.nni <2nh n /o f ?Q D P D D fT^nnc; M OQRV Cnlrl Qnrlnr, Cant Qnh D i e * QR 
PERB 1J3016 (2003), confirmed sub nom., Cold Spring Harbor Teachers Assn v New 
York State Pub EmpI Rel Bd, 12 AD 3d 443, 37 PERB 1J7009 (2d Dept 2004); Board of 
EducoftheCitySchDistofthe City of[NewYork,_39 PERB 1J3014 (2006). 
4
 NYCTA, 10 PERB TJ3077 (1977). See also, County of Suffolk (Dept of Labor 
Relations), 19 PERB P003 (1986). 
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Based on the foregoing, we deny Local 72's exceptions and affirm the Director's 
decision to dismiss the charge. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the improper practice charge is dismissed. 
DATED: August 29, 2007 
Albany, New York 
'—JeromeX^Fkowitz,-^hairman-
7LuJJ/ /f/J, 
Rob'ert S. fiife, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RAMAPO POLICE SUPERIOR OFFICER'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5604 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Employer, 
-and-
RAMAPO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
MICHAEL KLEIN, ESQ., TOWN ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board following the grant of leave to the Ramapo 
Police Superior Officer's Association (Association) to file exceptions pursuant to 
§212.4(g) of PERB's Rules of Practice (Rules) for the review of an interim ruling by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director), dated 
December 21, 2006. The Director's ruling denied a motion by the Association for 
certification without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules. 
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FACTS 
The Association filed a representation petition on May 22, 2006 seeking to 
fragment from a current unit represented by the Ramapo Police Benevolent 
Association (PBA), a unit composed of seven (7) employees in the Lieutenant title 
employed by the Town. The PBA did not file a response to the petition and informed 
the-Administrative-LawJudge-(ALJ),-through-counsel,that-it consented to4he 
proposed fragmentation. 
Thereafter, the Town consented to the proposed fragmentation of the 
Lieutenant title but contested whether three individuals holding the title should be 
included in the bargaining unit on the grounds that they are managerial or 
confidential and, therefore, are not public employees pursuant to §201.7(a) of the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
Following the Town's objection to the composition of the unit, the Director 
commenced an investigation pursuant to §201.9(a) of the Rules. On October 10, 
2006, a hearing was commenced before the ALJ on the issue, raised by the Town, 
of whether the three Lieutenants should be included in the fragmented unit because 
they are managerial or confidential. 
On October 23, 2006, the Association filed a letter motion with the Director 
requesting certification without an election pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules 
prior to a determination being reached on the issue of whether the three at-issue 
Lieutenants should be included in the bargaining unit. The Town opposed the 
Association's request. 
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On December 21, 2006, the Director issued an interim ruling denying the 
Association's motion for a certification without an election prior to a determination 
concerning the three Lieutenants' alleged managerial or confidential status. In his 
interim decision, the Director concluded that the agency's historical administrative 
practice of determining managerial and/or confidential status under the uniting 
criteria-setiorth-in-§20Z.l_oLthe^Act is-fully-ConsistenLwith-both the-Actand-Rules 
In its exceptions, the Association argues that that the Director erred in failing 
to certify the Association pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules while the managerial 
and/or confidential issue was pending before the ALJ. It contends that despite 
Board precedent and historical practices to the contrary, certification prior to a 
determination regarding resolution of a managerial and/or confidential issue is 
warranted under the Act and Rules. The Town supports the Director's interim ruling. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the Director. 
DISCUSSION 
In denying the Association's request for certification, the Director held that a 
determination on an employer's claim regarding an employee's purported 
managerial and/or confidential status under §201.7(a) is both necessary and proper 
in rendering a uniting determination under the criteria set forth in §207.1 of the Act. 
We agree. 
Contrary to the Association's argument, certification pursuant to §207.3 of the 
Act and §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules can take place only after the Director has 
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completed the investigation required by §201.9(a) of the Rules regarding the 
appropriate composition of the proposed unit. 
Prior to the 1971 amendment to the Act,1 which explicitly excluded 
managerial and confidential employees from the definition of "public employee" 
under the Act,2 the Board had already held, under the uniting standard set forth in 
§20Z.l(a)-otthe Act, thaLmanageriaLand_confidentiaLemployees_cannoLbe included 
in a bargaining unit containing other employees because of the existence of an 
inherent conflict of interest.3 
1
 L. 1971, ch 503, 504. 
2
 §201.7 states: The term "public employee" means any person holding a position 
by appointment or employment in the service of a public employer, except that 
such term shall not include for the purposes of any provision of this article other 
than sections two hundred ten and two hundred eleven of this article, judges and 
justices of the unified court system, persons holding positions by appointment or 
employment in the organized militia of the state and persons who may 
reasonably be designated from time to time as managerial or confidential upon 
application of the public employer to the appropriate board in accordance with 
procedures established pursuant to section two hundred five or two hundred 
twelve of this article, which procedures shall provide that any such designations 
made during a period of unchallenged representation pursuant to subdivision two 
of section two hundred eight of this chapter shall only become effective upon the 
termination of such period of unchallenged representation. Employees may be 
designated as managerial only if they are persons (i) who formulate policy or (ii) 
who may reasonably be required on behalf of the public employer to assist 
directly in the preparation for and conduct of collective negotiations or to have a 
major role in the administration of agreements or in personnel administration 
provided that such role is not of a routine or clerical nature and requires the 
exercise of independent judgment. Employees may be designated as confidential 
only if they are persons who assist and act in a confidential capacity to 
managerial employees described in clause (ii). 
3
 See, New York State Police, 1 PERB fl399.21 (1968); State of New York, 5 
PERB §3001 (1972). 
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There is nothing in the Act or the legislative history of the 1971 amendment to 
i 
demonstrate a legislative intent aimed at negatively impacting PERB's role in 
determining managerial and confidential issues prior to certifying a bargaining unit. 
To the contrary, the 1971 amendment constituted an expansion of PERB's 
jurisdiction in this area by granting the Board the authority to remove managerial and 
confidentiaLemployees-from-a-bargaining unit based on^an employer-application and 
a subsequent investigation by the Director. 
Following the 1971 amendment, PERB has continued to render 
determinations regarding managerial and/or confidential issues as part of uniting 
determinations prior to certification.4 The statutory basis for PERB's continued 
practice is self-evident: §207.1 of the Act requires PERB when defining the 
appropriate negotiation unit to take into account, inter alia: 
(a) the definition of the unit shall correspond to a community of interest 
among the employees to be included in the unit, (emphasis added) 
Pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act, employees who are determined to be 
managerial or confidential are not public employees entitled, as a matter of law, to 
be included in a bargaining unit prior to certification under §201.7(c). Nor are such 
employees entitled to representation under §203 of the Act. 
By examining whether a particular employee is managerial or confidential 
during the investigation of a representation petition, the Director is fulfilling the 
4
 See, McGraw Cent Sen Dist, 21 PERB 1J30Q1 (1988); City of Jamestown, 25 
PERB P015 (1992); Chautauqua County and Chautauqua County Sheriff, 26 
PERB 1J3070 (1993); Town of Greece, 27 PERB P024 (1994); City of Lockport, 
30 PERB P049 (1997); Owego-Apalachin Cent Sch Dist, 33 PERB P005 
(2000); State of New York, 36 PERB tf3029 (2003); State of New York (Office of 
Parks, Recreation and Historic Preservation), 39 PERB 1J3007 (2006). 
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statutory obligation of determining which employees should be included in the 
bargaining unit and thereby entitled to representation under the Act. 
As conceded by the Association in its brief, the first determination that must 
be made prior to certification is the appropriateness of the proposed bargaining unit. 
Here, the Town raised the question as to whether three of the seven lieutenants 
soughtto be-represented-byihe-AssociationJn-the proposed-unitshould-be-excluded 
by reason of having managerial or confidential responsibilities. Until the appropriate 
dimensions of the unit are determined, the Association cannot be certified. 
Therefore, we reject the Association's contention that the Board's precedent 
and historical practice is inconsistent with the policy underlying the Act and the 
Rules. In fact, a grant of certification to the Association prior to the completion of the 
Director's determination regarding unit composition would be premature. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Association's exceptions and affirm the 
interim decision of the Director. 
DATED: August 29, 2007 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowitz, Chairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
KINGSTON POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
INC., 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.LU26553 
- and -
CITY OF KINGSTON, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
ROEMER WALLENS & MINEAUX LLP (DIONNE A. WHEATLEY of counsel), 
for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the City of Kingston (City) to 
a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the City violated §209-
a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally 
discontinued a past practice of defraying the costs of police officers for veterinary 
services and food for specially trained police canines in their care after the canines have 
been taken out of service. 
The improper practice charge was filed by the Kingston Police Benevolent 
Association, Inc. (PBA), the exclusive bar^ainina renresentatlve of the City's police 
officers. The City alleged that the charge, filed on February 10, 2006, is untimely. It also 
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contended that there was no established past practice and that the subject matter of the 
charge is not a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
The ALJ found the charge timely and concluded that the PBA had established a 
past practice of the City's paying for routine veterinary care and food provided to the 
out-of-service canines cared for by the police officers and that these payments were an 
economic-benefitJorJhe-poliee-officers 
EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the City argues that the ALJ erred by finding that the charge 
was timely, that there was a cognizable past practice, and that the payment for the food 
and routine veterinary care is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The PBA supports the 
ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions.1 
The City and the PBA are parties to a collective bargaining agreement with a 
term of January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2007. The collective bargaining 
agreement is silent on the issues presented by this improper practice charge. 
The City has utilized canines in the police department since at least 1981. To be 
part of the K-9 unit, a police officer, along with an assigned canine, receive special 
training and certification to perform a variety of duties including: crowd control, search 
1
 40 PERB H4520 (2007). 
Case No. U-26553 -3-
and rescue, apprehending fleeing suspects, and self-defense. The specially trained n 
canine is assigned solely to the police officer who was trained to handle that canine. 
The canine is trained to respond only to the commands of that police officer handler. 
Following the training, the police officer handler and his/her assigned canine 
work together. When the canine is removed from service because of age or injury, or 
because-the-policeofficer-is-no-longer-assigned-toJhe-K^Q-unit^itremains-in-the-care 
and custody of the officer until it dies. The City has opted not to euthanize the out-of-
service police dogs immediately but to have them cared for by their former police officer 
handlers. 
Police Officer Roger Boughton testified that a practice of defraying the costs for 
the veterinary care and food for out-of-service canines in the care of their former police 
handlers was authorized by former Chief of Police Riggens in the mid-1990's following 
an oral request by Boughton and other K-9 unit officers. Boughton's unrefuted testimony 
was that Riggens told him that the City's Board of Police Commissioners, headed by the 
City's Mayor, had given approval to Chief Riggens for the City to pay for veterinary care 
and food for five years after the canines were taken out of service. At that time, there 
were five K-9 officers, but no out-of-service dogs. 
From approximately 1995 through 2005, in each of at least three 2 situations 
when a canine was removed from service, the City defrayed the assigned police 
officer's costs for food and routine veterinary care by paying the bills for those services 
2
 The record establishes that the City paid for the care of a fourth out-of-service canine, 
in the custody of police officer Appa in the K-9 unit, before it djed. However, the precise 
time frame of such payments is unclear from the record. 
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for a maximum of five years. None of the canines have lived more than five years after 
being placed out of service. 
The routine veterinary care paid for by the City that constituted the past practice 
included periodic examinations, vaccinations and medications.3 Documents in the 
record establish that the bills were paid by the City, whether or not an officer signed for 
the-services-or-purchases.4-
In the late 1990's, Boughton's assigned canine was taken out of service and for 
the next few years the City paid for the dog food and routine veterinary care including 
the dog's cremation. A second dog assigned to Boughton was taken out of service in 
May 2005, when Boughton was reassigned out of the K-9 unit. Boughton brought the 
dog to the veterinarian from May 2005 until it died in August 2006 and he was not billed. 
It was not until October 2006 that he received a bill from the veterinarian indicating that 
the City had not paid for the services rendered. Also, in April 2006, Boughton was told 
at the feed store that the City stopped paying the food bills for his out-of-service dog. 
In 1997, a dog assigned to former K-9 Police Officer John Van Etten was taken 
out-of-service. For over two years after being taken out of service, the City paid for the 
canine's routine veterinary care and food. 
Van Etten was assigned a second canine on the day that his first was taken out 
of service. In April 2005, at the time Van Etten went on GML §207-c disability leave, his 
3
 The record establishes that the practice of payment for routine veterinary care 
included euthanasia and cremation of out-of-service dogs in the custody of police officer 
handlers. During the decade long practice, the City paid for the euthanasia of one out-
of-service dog and the cremation for at least two out-of-service dogs. There is nothing in 
the record indicating the City's unwillingness to pay for these veterinary services 
regarding any other out-of-service dog. 
4Joint Exhibits 1,2, 3, 4. 
Case No. U-26553 -5-
second assigned canine was taken out of service and the City was billed for the routine 
veterinary care and food. However, the City did not pay those bills. Van Etten testified 
that in September 2005 he had heard a rumor that the City might discontinue paying for 
the food and routine veterinary care for out-of-service dogs. He called Anthony Solfaro 
of the New York State Union of Police Associations, with whom the PBA is affiliated, 
and-related-that-information.-ln-OGtober-2005,-Van-Etten-received-a4elephone-message 
from Deputy Chief Wallace, stating the City was not going to pay for the care and 
feeding of out-of-service dogs. Van Etten returned the call and Wallace confirmed that 
message. Thereafter, Van Etten left a telephone message for PBA President Wayne 
Maisch about the situation. Van Etten met with Maisch and gave him information and 
documentation regarding former Chief Riggens' authorization of the practice. 
Maisch testified that after meeting with Van Etten, he contacted Chief of Police 
Gerald Keller. Keller indicated to Maisch that he had no records regarding the City's 
payment for veterinary care and dog food bills. Nevertheless, Keller agreed to look into 
it. In early 2006, Keller told Maisch that because the City had no record of such 
payments, he would not pay for veterinary care and food bills for Van Etten's out-of-
service canine. 
Chief Keller testified that he first learned that there was an issue involving the 
City relating to the payment for food and veterinary care for out-of-service dogs in late 
August or early September 2005 when he received a telephone callfrom the City's labor 
counsel, James Roemer. Keller testified that Roemer told him that Solfaro had told 
Roemer that Solfaro had received a telephone call from Van Etten concerning this 
issue. After that phone call, Keller went to Maisch and told him that Van Etten had made 
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the call to Solfaro. In addition, Keller told Maisch that it was not his policy to pay for the 
food and care for dogs taken out of service. Thereafter, Keller checked with Lieutenant 
Tinti, who handles the K-9 unit's bills, and he advised Keller that to his knowledge the 
City had not made payments for any "retired" dog. Keller testified that he reiterated his 
policy to Maisch in late October or early November 2005, based on his conversations 
with-Tinti. 
DISCUSSION 
The City's exception regarding the timeliness of the charge is the threshold issue 
that must be considered. 
We conclude that Solfaro was acting as an agent for the PBA, in August or 
September 2005, when he spoke with Roemer and discussed the City's past practice 
regarding its payment for food and routine veterinary care. However, that conversation 
was just an inquiry by Solfaro on behalf of Van Etten as to whether there was any 
substance to a rumor that the practice was changing. During the conversation, Solfaro 
was not given a definitive answer. 
The ALJ credited Maisch's testimony that while the PBA and the City had 
discussions sometime in October or November 2005 about whether a practice existed, it 
was not until early 2006 that Keller unequivocally told Maisch that the City would not 
pay for the veterinary care and food for out-of-service dogs. Furthermore, Keller testified 
that he told Maisch in late October or early November 2005, that the City would not 
make the at-issue payments, still making the charge timely. 
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As the charge was filed on February 10, 2006, it was timely as long as the PBA 
first learned of the change after October 10, 2005, and we conclude that it did.5 
The next inquiry is whether the payment by the City for veterinary care and food 
for the out-of-service dogs living with the police officer handler is a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. We find that it is. 
T4ie-provision-by4he-City-of-theve^^ 
is an economic benefit and thus a form of compensation for unit employees, which 
makes it a mandatory subject of negotiation, whether or not it has a direct relationship to 
any aspect of job performance.6 As Van Etten testified, he now pays for the dog's 
veterinary care and food out of his own pocket, as did Boughton. 
Next, we consider whether a past practice has been established with respect to 
the City paying for the veterinary care and food for out-of-service canines. As the Board 
recently decided in Chenango Forks Central School District,7 a past practice is 
established where the "practice was unequivocal and was continued uninterrupted for a 
period of time under the circumstances to create a reasonable expectation among the 
affected unit employees that the [practice] would continue."8 In Chenango Forks, supra, 
we explained that "the clear meaning of our decision... is that the expectation of the 
5
 PERB's Rules of Procedure, §204.1 (a). 
6
 Town of Haverstraw v Newman, 75 AD2d 874,13 PERB<T7007 (2d Dept 1980). 
7
 40 PERB 1(3012(2007). 
8
 Citing to County of Nassau, 24PERB 1J3029, at 3058"(1991). 
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continuation of the practice is something that may be presumed from its duration with 
consideration of the specific circumstances under which the practice has existed."9 
In the present case, the testimony and documents establish that, for 
approximately ten years, the City paid for the veterinary care and the food for canines 
removed from service in the K-9 unit consistent with the policy authorized by former 
Chief-of-Boliee-Riggins. Thepolice officers-were-aware-of-the-decade-long-practice, 
That is sufficient to render the past practice binding on the City, although it involved the 
cost for at minimum three out-of-service canines and two police officer handlers. 
The practice was authorized by then Chief Riggens and continued for seven 
years under Chief Keller from 1998 through 2005. The City paid for the dog food and 
routine veterinary care during Chief Keller's tenure, despite his testimony denying the 
existence of such a practice. Indeed, as the Board noted in Chenango Forks, supra, 
even when an employer's managerial or supervisory staff have changed over time, the 
employer will be bound by a practice established under a prior administration or 
manager when: 
the extended period of the practice alone, under normal 
circumstances, would have constituted circumstantial 
evidence sufficient to establish a prima facie proof of the 
employer's knowledge, thereby imposing upon the 
[employer] the burden of proof of demonstrating that under 
the totality of the circumstances it did not have actual or 
constructive knowledge of the past practice.10 
The record establishes that the bills from the veterinarian along with bills from the 
feed store were regularly paid by the City for out-of-service canines in at least three 
9
 40 PERB 1J3012 at _ (2007). 
,
 10
 40 PERB P 0 1 2 a t _ (2007). 
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situations for over a decade. In each situation, the City made the payments for a few 
years before the out-of-service dog died. 
Nevertheless, the City argues that the Board of Police Commissioners and the Mayor 
did not have knowledge of or agree to the practice. The ALJ found that to be immaterial 
given Boughton's testimony that former Chief Riggens had told him that he had brought the 
proposal4o4he-Board-of-Police-Commissionersand-returned with-their-approval, 
The City contends that Boughton's testimony is not enough to establish that the 
Mayor or the City's Common Council had approved, or was even aware, of the practice. 
However, Chenango Forks, supra, makes clear that the length of time of the 
practice, under appropriate circumstances, is sufficient to bind the City. In that case, we 
expressly rejected the notion that additional proof of mutuality of agreement, knowledge 
or acquiescence by a managerial or high level supervisory employee is necessary to 
) 
establish such a past practice. In any event, in the present case the highest ranking 
member of the police department, former Chief Riggens, stated the policy and 
acquiesced to the practice of paying for the routine care and food for the out-of-service 
police dogs. Moreover, as we recognized in Chenago Forks, the fact that the practice 
included making payments from the employer's budget constitutes appropriate 
circumstances sufficient to establish that the City had actual or constructive knowledge 
of the practice.11 
11
 During the hearing, the City did not present any evidence regarding the police 
department's budget or the respective roles played by the Chief or the Board of Police 
Commissioners in reviewing and preparing the annual departmental budget. 
Case No. U-26553 -10-
We find, therefore, that the City violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it unilaterally 
discontinued its practice of paying for routine veterinary care and food bills for out-of-
service dogs in the care of the City's police officers.12 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the City's exceptions and affirm the decision 
and order of the ALJ. 
IT-IS,-THEREI=ORE,-ORDERED4hat4he^City-forthwith^ 
1. Restore the practice of paying for routine veterinary care and 
food for dogs that have been taken out of service from the 
City's K-9 unit and given to their police officer handlers; 
2. Pay any outstanding food and veterinary bills incurred by 
employees in accordance with its practice; 
3. Make employees whole for any payments they have made 
as a direct result of the City's termination of the practice, 
plus interest at the maximum legal rate; and 
4. Post the attached notice at all locations normally used to 
communicate with employees in the unit represented by the 
PBA. 
DATED: August 29, 2007 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lef^owitzft^nairman 
Robert S.^rfite, Member 
12
 The City has not filed an exception to the ALJ's proposed remedial order. Therefore, 
it is waived pursuant to §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules of Procedure. See, State of New York 
(OMH), 31 PERB 113051 (1998);NYCTA, 35 PERB 1J3028 (2002); Town ofOrangetown, 
40 PERB H3008 (2007). 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the City of Kingston in the unit represented by 
the Kingston Police Benevolent Association, Inc. that the City will forthwith: 
1. Restore the practice of paying for routine veterinary care and food for 
dogs that have been taken out of service from the City's K-9 unit and 
given to their police officer handlers; 
2. Pay any outstanding food and veterinary bills incurred by employees in 
accordance with its practice; and 
3. Make employees whole for any payments they have made as a direct 
result of the City's termination of the practice, plus interest at the 
maximum legal rate. 
D a t e d . . . . . . . . . . By". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
(Representative) (Title) 
i 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and 
must not be altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 
CASE NO. DR-119 
Upon a Petition for Declaratory Ruling 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (M. DAVID ZURNDORFER, NEIL H. ABRAMSON 
and DANIEL ALTCHECK, of counsel), for the City of New York 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Association of the City of New York, Inc. 
O'DONNELL, SCHWARTZ, GLANSTEIN & LILLY, LLP. (JOEL C. 
GLANSTEIN, of counsel) for Lieutenants Benevolent Association, Amicus 
Curiae 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for New York State Union of Police Associations, 
Amicus Curiae 
GREENBERG BURZICHELLI GREENBERG P.C. (HARRY GREENBERG, of 
counsel), for Captains Endowment Association, Inc., Amicus Curiae 
DAVIS & HERSH, LLP (DAVID A. DAVIS, of counsel), for the Suffolk County 
Police Conference, Amicus Curiae 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the City of New York, Inc. (PBA) and the City of New York (City), 
pursuant to PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules) §201.12 to various conclusions reached 
by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) in a Recommended Declaratory Ruling and 
Decision (Decision) regarding the negotiability of seven PBA proposals included in its 
interest arbitration petition.1 
The City filed a declaratory ruling petition for a determination whether the 
following proposals were mandatory or nonmandatory subjects of negotiations: 
1
 40 PERB 1J6601 (2007). 
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attainment of safe staffing levels; work schedule; bullet-resistant vests; chronic sick 
program; contract maintenance; and premium pay for lack of a negotiable disciplinary 
procedure. 
In response to the City's petition, the PBA contended that each proposal is a 
mandatory subject or should be treated as a mandatory subject under the conversion 
theory of negotiability originally adopted by the Board in City of Cohoes (Cohoes).2 
In the Decision, the ALJ concluded that the PBA's demands relating to safe 
staffing levels, bullet-resistant vests, chronic sick program and contract maintenance 
were nonmandatory subjects of bargaining and, therefore, were not properly submitted 
to interest arbitration. Further, the ALJ rejected the PBA's arguments that those four 
demands had been converted under Cohoes into mandatory subjects based on the 
provisions of the expired agreement. 
With respect to the PBA's work schedule proposal, the ALJ concluded that it 
constituted a prohibited subject of bargaining based on Unconsol. § 971(d). 
Additionally, the ALJ concluded that the demands for safety and health 
maintenance and premium pay for the lack of a negotiable disciplinary procedure were 
mandatory subjects of bargaining and, therefore, properly submitted to interest 
arbitration by the PBA. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The PBA filed five exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusions that the safe 
staffing levels, bullet-resistant vests, chronic sick program and contract maintenance 
demands were nonmandatory subjects and that the work schedule demand was a 
2
 31 PERB U3020 (1998), confirmed sub nom., 32 PERB TJ7026 (Sup Ct Albany 
County), affd, Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562 vCuevas, 276 AD26 
184, 33 PERB fl7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB fi7018 
(2001). 
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prohibited subject. 
The City filed two exceptions challenging the ALJ's conclusions that the demand 
for premium pay for the lack of a negotiable disciplinary procedure was a mandatory 
subject of bargaining and the ALJ's conclusion that the demand regarding work 
schedules constituted a prohibited subject of bargaining rather than a nonmandatory 
subject. With respect to the premium pay demand, the City asserts that it is 
nonmandatory because it seeks compensation unrelated to the performance of work or 
a prohibited subject under the holding in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v New 
York State Public Employment Relations Board.3 
The City did not file an exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the safety and 
health maintenance proposal was a mandatory subject of bargaining and it supports the 
ALJ's other findings. 
Following the filing of the exceptions, the Board issued an interim decision 
granting leave to four employee organizations to appear as amici curiae: Lieutenants 
Benevolent Association (LBA), New York State Union of Police Associations (NYSUPA), 
Captains Endowment Association, Inc. (CEA), and the Suffolk County Police 
Conference (Police Conference).4 The separate briefs from the four amici challenge the 
ALJ's conclusion that the work schedules demand was a prohibited subject of 
bargaining and contend that it was a mandatory subject of bargaining. Amici CEA, 
NYSUPA and the Police Conference argue in the alternative that if the subject matter of 
the demand was nonmandatory it was converted to mandatory under Cohoes. Finally, 
amicus NYSUPA's brief challenges, in general, the ALJ's analysis and application of 
Cohoes and subsequent cases regarding the conversion theory of negotiations. 
3
 6 NY3d 563, 39 PERB fl7006 (2006). 
440PERB 1|3005(2007). 
Case No. DR-119 -4-
Based upon our review of the record and our consideration of the arguments 
submitted, we affirm, in part, and reverse, in part, the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The case was decided by the ALJ on a stipulated record submitted by the 
parties. The specific language for each of the PBA's six demands at issue in the 
exceptions is set forth below in the discussion regarding the negotiability of each 
demand. 
DISCUSSION 
We begin our discussion with an examination of the ALJ's findings that the PBA's 
two health and safety proposals were nonmandatory. The first safety proposal regarding 
staffing states: 
Attainment of Safe Staffing Levels 
) In order to safeguard and ensure the health and safety of 
police officers performing patrol functions, a Joint-Labor 
Management Committee consisting of two representatives 
appointed by the Union and the City shall be convened to 
establish expeditiously the minimum manning in each patrol 
precinct and patrol command within the City of New York. 
The NYPD will be required to staff each patrol command at 
the levels established by the Labor Management Committee. 
To the extent that the agreed to minimum manning levels 
cannot be met with the officers scheduled for duty, the 
NYPD shall be required to call in additional officers on 
overtime. 
In the event of a failure to reach an agreement between the 
Union and the Employer as to the appropriate manning 
levels, the issue shall be submitted to binding arbitration 
pursuant to the grievance procedures in the collective 
bargaining agreement. 
The Board has long recognized that the general topic of safety of employees 
: beyond the normal hazards inherent in their work is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
In determining whether a proposal regarding safety is a mandatory subject, we focus on 
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the demand's primary or predominate characteristic.5 However, the application of the 
) term "safety" is not a label capable of automatically transforming a nonmandatory 
subject, such as minimum staffing, into a mandatory subject of bargaining.6 
Although a demand relating to safety may constitute a mandatory subject, our 
cases have equally recognized that determinations relating to staffing and deployment 
of personnel are nonmandatory because they are managerial prerogatives tied to the 
public employer's mission to provide public services.7 
Recognizing the thin line that can separate mandatory from nonmandatory 
proposals relating to safety and staffing, the Board has found that a bargaining proposal 
seeking the creation of a health and safety labor-management committee working under 
general guidelines to examine specific factual situations and subject to the grievance 
arbitration procedure, can constitute a mandatory subject of bargaining.8 For example, 
) in Uniformed Firefighters Association, Local 273, IAFF9 and White Plains Professional 
Firefighters Association10, the Board held that a proposal for the creation of a general 
5
 Police Assn of New Rochelle, Inc., 10 PERB fi3042 (1977); Troy Uniformed 
Firefighters Assn, Local 2304, IAFF, 10 PERB p i 05 (1977); City of Mount 
Vernon, 11 PERB 1(3049 (1978). 
6
 City of New Rochelle v Crowley, 61 AD2d 1031,11 PERB 1J7002 (2d Dept 1978). 
7
 White Plains PBA, 9 PERB fi3007 (1976); IntlAssn of Firefighters of the City of 
Newburgh, Local 589, 10 PERB 1J3001 (1977), confirmed sub nom; IntlAssn of 
Firefighters v Helsby, 59 AD2d 342, 10 PERB H7019 (3d Dept 1977) Iv denied, 
43 NY2d 649 (1978); Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Inc., Local 273, IAFF, 10 
PERB 1|3078(1977), confirmed sub nom., City of New Rochelle v Crowley, 
supra; State of New York (Dept of Transportation), 27 PERB 1J3056 (1994); Town 
of Carmel, 31 PERB 3006 (1998). . 
8
 White Plains PBA, supra; IntlAssn of Firefighters of the City of Newburgh, Local 
589, supra; Uniformed Firefighters Assn, Local 273, IAFF supra; White Plains 
Professional Firefighters Assn, Local 274, IAFF, 11 PERB 1J3089 (1978). 
j 9 Supra, note 7. 
10
 Supra, note 8. 
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health and safety committee, subject to grievance arbitration, with jurisdiction over "all 
) matters of safety and health to the members of the Fire Department including but not 
limited to, the total number of employees reporting to a fire and the minimum number of 
employees to be assigned to each piece of firefighting apparatus"11 constituted a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
In the present case, the ALJ concluded that the PBA's demand seeking the 
creation of a labor-management committee for the attainment of safe staffing levels, 
with unresolved disputes subject to binding arbitration, was a nonmandatory subject of 
bargaining. We agree. 
Contrary to the PBA's argument, the primary characteristic of its demand is not 
safety. Rather, it is an effort to establish an enforceable procedural means to usurp the 
City's fundamental prerogative to determine the appropriate level of police staffing. As 
) such, the proposal constitutes a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 
Nor can the proposal be reasonably construed, as claimed by the PBA, as a 
safety and health maintenance clause and, therefore, mandatorily negotiable.12 As 
noted, the PBA proposed a separate safety and health maintenance clause that the ALJ 
correctly concluded was a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
In the alternative, the PBA challenges the ALJ's rejection of its argument that the 
staffing proposal constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining under Cohoes13 and its 
progeny. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ALJ's reasoning for rejecting 
the PBA's argument under Cohoes. 
1110PERBat3132. 
12
 Town of Niagara, 14 PERBp049 (1981). 
i 
13
 Supra, note 2. 
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In Cohoes, the Board established a supplemental theory of negotiability that 
) converts nonmandatory subjects contained in collective bargaining agreements into 
mandatory subjects of negotiations between the parties to that agreement. The central 
rationale underlying the conversion theory was the Board's view that there was a 
fundamental structural imbalance in negotiations where an employer is obligated to 
continue all terms and conditions of employment in a contract, including provisions that 
are nonmandatory in nature, pursuant to §209-a.1(e) of the Act but that the 
nonmandatory subjects in the agreement did not have to be negotiated. 
As the Board stated in Cohoes: 
This unilateral veto power over the scope of collective 
negotiations, whether wielded by employers or unions, is 
itself contrary to the policies of the Act. The result is as ironic 
as it is unfair for it has elevated nonmandatory subjects of 
negotiation to a legal status above that of mandatory 
subjects.14 
) 
In the present case, the PBA contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find that the 
nonmandatory staffing proposal was converted into a mandatory subject based on the 
negotiated article contained in the expired 2002-2004 agreement between the parties 
regarding a general health and safety labor-management committee.15 
i, 
The PBA does not question the merit of the ALJ's conclusion that the negotiated 
labor-management committee article constituted a mandatory subject of bargaining 
1431 PERBat3040. 
15
 Stipulated Record, Exhibit E, Response to Petition for A Declaratory Ruling, 
Exhibit B, pp. 26-27. Article XXVII, §2 provides that: "The labor-management 
committee shall consider and may recommend to the Police Commissioner 
changes in working conditions of employees, including, but not limited, to the 
following subjects: the adequate levels of Police coverage to ensure the safety of 
employees on duty; an excusal policy for employees appearing in court after the 
midnight tour. Matters subject to the grievance procedure shall not be 
appropriate items for consideration by the labor-management committee." 
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under Board precedent. Instead, the PBA, along with amicus NYSUPA, contend that 
) under Cohoes, the presence of a mandatory subject in a collectively negotiated 
agreement transforms a nonmandatory proposal seeking to impose restrictions on a 
managerial prerogative into a mandatory subject because it is arguably related to the 
mandatory provision in the expired agreement. 
We are not persuaded that there is any rationale under the Act for the expansion 
of the Cohoes conversion theory that would transform nonmandatory subjects not 
already contained in an agreement into mandatory subjects. Unlike the negotiating 
disparity that the Board sought to remedy in Cohoes, no structural imbalance exists 
between the parties with respect to the negotiability of nonmandatory subjects outside 
of an agreement. Neither an employer nor an employee organization is obligated to 
negotiate such a subject and they are mutually impacted when a nonmandatory subject 
) is incorporated into an agreement: it is converted, as a matter of law, into a mandatory 
subject in subsequent negotiations. 
Furthermore, adoption of the PBA's argument has the potential for undermining 
the stability of negotiations by inappropriately and unnecessarily blurring the distinction 
under a traditional scope analysis between mandatory and nonmandatory subjects. 
Contrary to the arguments made by the PBA and amici NYSUPA and the Police 
Conference, Board precedent subsequent to Cohoes does not demonstrate an explicit 
or implicit adoption of the proposed appurtenance to the Cohoes theory of conversion. 
The PBA and amicus NYSUPA cite to four cases subsequent to Cohoes to support an 
expansion of the conversion theory of negotiability: Greenburgh No. 11 Union Free 
School District (Greenburgh)?6 Town of Yorktown Police Benevolent Association, Inc. 
\ 
16
 32 PERB 1J3024(1999). 
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(Yorktown),n Village of Saugerties Police Benevolent Association (Saugerties)™ and 
Town of Fishkill Police Fraternity, Inc.(Fishkill).™ 
In Fishkill, the Board reiterated the central rationale for the Cohoes conversion 
theory: "Cohoes was intended to give parties an avenue to discuss and change 
nonmandatory contract terms."20 
The dicta from Greenburgh, cited by amici NYSUPA and the Police Conference 
regarding "any legal term" in a contract being subject to negotiation regarding deletion, 
modification or continuation was utilized in the context of explaining the Cohoes 
rationale for the conversion of nonmandatory subjects already contained in a contract.21 
In Yorktown, the Board made clear that the Cohoes conversion theory is 
applicable only to efforts at deleting or modifying nonmandatory subjects already 
included in an agreement: 
Cohoes was intended to give parties an avenue to address 
contractual provisions which deal with nonmandatory 
subjects of negotiations. Not only does it provide parties 
with the means to argue at interest arbitration that a contract 
provision dealing with a nonmandatory subject should be 
removed, it is also a tool to modify nonmandatory contract 
provisions, as long as the proposed modification is 
reasonably related to specific language of the nonmandatory 
contract provision.22 
Similarly, Saugerties can not be reasonably interpreted to constitute an adoption 
of an expanded view of the supplemental theory of negotiations under Cohoes, as 
17
 35 PERB 1J3017 (2002). 
18
 38 PERB 113034(2005). 
19
 39 PERB 1J3035 (2006). 
20
 Id. at 3119. 
21
 Supra, note 16 at 3047-3048. 
22
 35 PERB at 3041. See also, City of New York, 35 PERB H3034 (2002). 
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amicus NYSUPA contends. In Saugerties, the Board affirmed the ALJ's conclusions 
that the subject matters of the four proposals were mandatorily negotiable and, in the 
alternative, they were negotiable under Cohoes. To the extent that Saugerties might be 
interpreted as permitting the conversion of a nonmandatory proposal on the basis that it 
relates to a contract provision involving a mandatory subject, we hereby reject such 
interpretation of Saugerties. 
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ALJ's conclusion that the PBA's 
nonmandatory proposal was not converted under Cohoes into a mandatory proposal.23 
The second PBA health and safety proposal relates to bullet-resistant vests. The 
proposal states: 
Vests 
The Employer shall issue new bullet-resistant vests to every 
police officer reflecting the current state of technology no 
less than once every five years from the date that Police 
Officer's current vest was issued but no later than the 
expiration day of the warranty for the vest. 
The ALJ found that the proposal t.o mandate the purchase and issuance of new 
bullet-resistant vests on a periodic basis was nonmandatory. The ALJ reached that 
conclusion by analogizing to Board precedent holding that the selection and deployment 
of weapons for law enforcement as well as the amount of ammunition were 
nonmandatory subjects.24 In those earlier decisions, the Board concluded that such 
23
 Based on our rejection of the PBA's argument under Cohoes, we need not 
reach the issue of whether the PBA's proposal constituted the creation of a new 
contractual obligation rather than a mere modification of a pre-existing 
nonmandatory provision under Cohoes by seeking to make staffing decisions 
subject to binding arbitration. 
24City of Albany PBA, 7 PERB1J3078 (1974); Local 294, Intl Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, 10 PERB 
113007(1977). 
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equipment related directly to the manner and means that police services are provided, 
thereby constituting a managerial prerogative.25 
Despite the common use of bullet-resistant vests for the safety of members of 
law enforcement, the Board has never been called upon to determine whether a 
demand relating to such vests constitutes a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
A review of the proposal reveals that its paramount purpose is to ensure that 
police officers will not be utilizing unsafe and outdated safety equipment by requiring the 
purchase and distribution of new vests on a periodic basis.26 Unlike weapons and 
ammunition, bullet-proof vests are safety-sensitive and defensive in nature. Their use is 
solely aimed at protecting the life and well-being of police officers. 
Significantly, the PBA's proposal does not seek to negotiate when such vests are 
to be utilized by bargaining unit members or seek to limit managerial discretion 
regarding deployment of personnel. Such a proposal might be nonmandatory because it 
could impact the manner and means that police services are provided. 
But a balancing between the interests of the PBA and the City regarding this 
proposal demonstrates that it is a mandatory subject of bargaining.27 The PBA's interest 
in protecting the safety and well-being of its members by ensuring that safety equipment 
is safe and modernized outweighs the City's interest with respect to the cost associated 
™ld. ~ 
26
 See, Scarsdale PBA, 8 PERB P075 (1975); PBA of the City of White Plains, 
12 PERB 1J3046(1979). 
27
 In reaching our conclusion, we have reviewed the ALJ decision in Police Assn 
of the City of New Rochelle, 13 PERB 1J4540, affd on other grounds, 13 PERB 
1J3082 (1980), cited by the parties. The Board is not bound by earlier unreviewed 
ALJ decisions. Westchester County Department of Correction Superior Officers' 
Assn, 26 PERBU3077 (1993). We find the ALJ's conclusion in Police Assn< ofthe 
City of New Rochelle regarding the negotiability of bullet-resistant vests to be 
conclusory in nature and, thereby, unpersuasive. 
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with the demand. The balancing of respective interests of the City and PBA with regard 
to the subject matter at issue is fully consistent with our methodology in determining 
whether specific subjects are mandatorily negotiable.28 In reaching the conclusion that 
the demand is a mandatory subject, we are not deciding the merits of the demand, only 
its negotiability. 
Based on our conclusion that the PBA's demand regarding bullet-resistant vests 
is a mandatory subject of bargaining, we do not need to reach whether it is a mandatory 
subject under the conversion theory of negotiations. 
Work Schedule 
We next turn to the exceptions filed by both the PBA and the City challenging the 
ALJ's conclusion that the PBA's work schedule proposal constituted a prohibited subject 
of bargaining. The PBA's original proposal states: 
NYPD will adopt a modern chart for police officers, 
implementing duty schedules that replicate or are similar to 
those in other jurisdictions that will require either 10 hour or 
12 hour tours, plus or minus increments of less than an hour 
(i.e., a 12 hour, 15 minute tour, a 10 hour, 30 minute tour), 
and fewer appearances. 
By stipulation, the proposal was clarified in response to the City's contention that 
it was vague and ambiguous. The stipulated clarification states: 
The PBA's "Work Schedule" proposal is seeking either ten 
hour tours or twelve hour tours (or a combination of the two) 
with the requisite number of appearances so that officers 
work 2088 hours per year.29 
28
 See, State of New York (Dept of Transp), 27 PERB fl3056 (1994). In applying 
the balancing test, we are not suggesting that the City is indifferent to the safety 
of its police officers by asserting that it is a nonmandatory subject. 
j 29 Based on the clarification, the City withdrew its vagueness challenge to the 
proposal. 
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As clarified by the stipulation, the PBA's proposal is aimed at establishing tours 
beyond eight hours. It does not seek to restrict the City's authority to decide staffing 
needs or the discretion of the City to establish platoons or charts. 
The ALJ concluded that the proposal was a prohibited subject based on the text of 
Unconsol. § 971(d).30 In addition, he relied upon New York Court of Appeals precedent 
concluding that other statutes prohibited the negotiation of certain subjects.31 Relying 
on the Unconsol. § 971(d) provision that states no member "shall be assigned to 
perform a tour of duty in excess of eight hours," except in specifically identified 
circumstances, the ALJ found the PBA proposal seeking tours of duty in excess of eight 
hours to be a prohibited subject of bargaining. 
Although the PBA and the City have both filed exceptions to that conclusion, they 
differ regarding whether the work schedule proposal is a mandatory or nonmandatory 
) subject of bargaining. 
The PBA contends that the proposal is a mandatory subject based on Board 
Unconsol. § 971 (d) provides: In the city of New York, the police commissioner, 
and in the city of Syracuse, the chief of police, shall promulgate duty charts for 
members of the police force which distribute the available police force according 
to the relative need for its services. This need shall be measured by the 
incidence of police hazard and criminal activity or other similar factor or factors. 
No member of the force shall be assigned to perform a tour of duty in excess of 
eight consecutive hours excepting only that in the event of strikes, riots, 
conflagrations or occasions when large crowds shall assemble, or other 
emergency, or on a day on which an election authorized by law shall be held, or 
for the purpose of changing tours of duty so many members may be continued 
on duty for such hours as may be necessary. No member shall be assigned to an 
average of more than forty hours of duty during any seven consecutive day 
period except in an emergency or as permitted in this subdivision or for the 
purpose of changing tours of duty or as otherwise provided for by law. 
31
 See, Schenectady PBA v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 85 NY2d 480, 28 
PERB U7005 (1995); Webster Cent Sch DistvNeW York State Pub Empl RelBd, 
75 NY 2d 619, 23 PERB 1J7013 (1990). See also, Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn 
v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, supra, note 3. 
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precedent holding that a proposed change to tours of duty which does not interfere with 
an employer's right to determine staffing requirements is a mandatory subject of 
bargaining. In particular, the PBA cites to the Board's 2004 decision in Patrolmen's 
Benevolent Association holding that a virtually identical proposal was a mandatory 
subject of bargaining.32 In the alternative, the PBA argues that if the subject matter of 
the proposal is nonmandatory, it is converted into a mandatory subject under Cohoes. 
The City, in support of its argument that the work schedule proposal is 
nonmandatory, relies on judicial decisions and informal opinions of the New York State 
Attorney General analyzing the negotiability of proposals that conflict with a similar 
statutory provision, Unconsol. §971 (a), regarding tours of duty for police working for 
other local public employers. 
Amid LBA, NYSUPA, CEA and the Police Conference have all filed briefs 
supporting the challenge to the ALJ's conclusion that the proposal was a prohibited 
subject of bargaining and argue that the proposal constitutes a mandatory subject. 
The first question we must examine is whether the broad mandate under the Act 
for negotiations about terms and conditions of employment is negated or circumscribed 
by the clear legislative intent derived from Unconsol. § 971(d). 
In Schenectady Police Benevolent Association v New York State Public 
Employment Relations Board33 and Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v New York 
State Public Employment Relations Board34, the Court of Appeals concluded that 
37 PERB 1J3033 at 3098, 3100 (2004). 
85 NY2d at 485-486/28 PERB at 7012 (1995). 
6 NY3d at 572-573, 39 PERB at 7008 (2006). 
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legislation that pre-dated the Act demonstrated a legislative intent to preclude 
negotiations regarding certain powers and authority granted public employers.35 
Based upon our review of the legal arguments raised by the PBA, City and amici, 
we disagree with the ALJ's conclusion that the work schedule proposal constituted a 
prohibited subject of bargaining. 
In MacNish v Waldo,36 the Court of Appeals concluded that the primary legislative 
purpose for the eight hour statutory limitation on police tours of duty, contained in the 
precursor statute, the so-called "Three Platoon" law, was the promotion of the health 
and efficiency of police officers. When the statute was amended in 1969 to eliminate the 
mandatory three platoon system for New York City and the City of Syracuse, the 
Legislature chose to retain the eight hour limitation on police tours.37 
It is well settled that other statutory protections and benefits for employees in 
) New York can be waived under the terms of a collective bargaining agreement.38 In City 
of Schenectady,39 the Board concluded that the eight hour limitation on police tours in 
other local governments, contained in another subsection of Unconsol. §971, 
constituted a waivable statutory overtime restriction. Both the Appellate Division, 
35
 At the same time, courts have upheld the Board's conclusion in Cohoes that an 
employer proposal seeking an employee organization's waiver of statutory rights 
of bargaining unit members is a mandatory subject of bargaining as long as the 
wavier is consistent with public policy and not contrary to legislative intent. 
Uniform Firefighters of Cohoes, Local 2562, IAFF v Cuevas, 276 AD2d 184, 33 
PERB H7019 (3d Dept 2000), Iv denied 96 NY2d 711, 34 PERB fl7018 (2001). 
36
 212 NY 348, 350 (1914), mot for rehearing den, 212 NY 610 (1914). 
37
 L. 1969, c. 177 (McKinneys). 
38
 See, Board of Education of the City of Rochester v Nyquist, 48 NY2d 97, 104-
105 (1979); American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v Roberts, 61 NY2d 244, 
249-250(1984). 
18 PERB P035 (1985). 
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Second Department and the New York Attorney General have found that the same 
) provision does not bar negotiations.40 
In 1975, in PBA of the City of New York^, the New York City Board of Collective 
Bargaining (BCB) ruled that Unconsol. § 971(d) did not prohibit the negotiability of the 
length of police tours noting the established practice of police exceeding eight hours. 
The following year, a similar finding was reached by a PERB ALJ in the context of a 
related improper practice charge.42 
Therefore, after consideration of the history, text and prior interpretations of 
Unconsol. §971, we reverse the ALJ's conclusion that the statutory eight hour limitation 
renders the PBA's proposal a prohibited subject of bargaining. 
The second question we need to resolve is whether the PBA's proposal is a 
mandatory subject of bargaining. 
) We conclude that the proposal is a mandatory subject based on our decision 
three years ago in Patrolmen's Benevolent Associationwith respect to a similar prior 
PBA proposal, along with the well-established precedent finding that proposals relating 
to tours of duty and work schedule are mandatory subjects as long as they do not 
interfere with an employer's determination regarding staffing and other managerial 
40
 Spring Valley PBA v Village of Spring Valley, 80 AD2d 910, 911,14 PERB 
1J7515, at 7522 (2d Dept 1981); 1978 Op Atty Gen (Inf) 297; 1992 Op Atty Gen 
(Inf) 21. See also, Follett v Sejan, 123 Misc2d 263, 17 PERB 1J7513 (Sup Ct 
Broome Co. 1984). Contrary to the City's argument, neither the court decision 
nor the advisory opinions support the conclusion that subject matter is a 
nonmandatory subject of bargaining. 
41
 B-24-75 (1975), confirmed sub nom., 9 PERB 1J7501 (Sup Ct New York County 
1976); See also, B-5-75 (1975). 
City of New York, 9 PERB 1J4502 (1976). 
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prerogatives.43 Furthermore, as the Board reiterated in Cohoes, a demand by an 
employee organization for the wavier of an employee's statutory right or privilege is a 
mandatory subject unless it would violate public policy. 
We next consider the PBA's exception to the ALJ's conclusion that the chronic 
sick program proposal was nonmandatory. The PBA proposal states: 
Chronic Sick Program 
All sick leave taken as a result of Line of Duty injuries shall 
be exempt from consideration in the NYPD's chronic sick 
leave program. By making this demand, the PBA expressly 
does not acknowledge or concede the legality of the chronic 
sick leave program. 
The ALJ concluded that the proposal was nonmandatory because it seeks to limit 
the criteria the City may utilize in determining whether a police officer is abusing sick 
leave. We agree. 
The PBA argues that its proposal is mandatory subject based on cases finding 
that sick leave, generally, as well as procedures relating to the grant or denial of sick 
leave are mandatory subjects. Alternatively, it contends that the proposal is mandatory 
under Cohoes. The City supports the ALJ's conclusion contending that the proposal 
would interfere with a managerial prerogative regarding sick leave abuse. 
An employer has the inherent managerial right to establish the standards to 
determine sick leave abuse and to monitor an employee's use of sick leave under those 
standards.44 Therefore, as the ALJ correctly found, the PBA's proposal is nonmandatory 
Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn, supra, note 34; City of New York, 35 PERB 
113034 at 3098 (2002); Starpoint Cent Sch Dist, 23 PERB fl3012 (1990); Town of 
Yorktown, 35 PERB at 3040-3041; Village of Mamaroneck PBA, 22 PERB fl3029 
(1989); Town of Blooming Grove, 21 PERB P032 (1988); City of White Plains, 5 
PERB 113008(1972). 
44
 Poughkeepsie City Sch Dist, 19 PERB 1J3046 (1986); Town of Carmel, 31 
PERB H3023 (1998). 
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because it seeks to place limitations on the standards that the City may apply in 
determining sick leave abuse.45 In addition, we concur with the ALJ that the PBA's 
nonmandatory proposal is not converted under Cohoes because it does not seek to 
modify or alter a nonmandatory subject in the expired agreement. 
Our discussion now turns to the ALJ's finding that the contract maintenance 
proposal was a unitary demand containing both nonmandatory and mandatory issues 
rendering the entire proposal nonmandatory. The proposal states: 
Contract Maintenance 
The Employer shall provide written notification to the PBA in 
advance of any change in the Patrol Guide, Administrative 
Guide or any other change in the terms and conditions of 
employment. 
The Board has long held that when a proposal contains two or more inseparable 
elements at least one of which is nonmandatory, the entire proposal is deemed 
nonmandatory.46 
The ALJ concluded that the PBA's proposal was nonmandatory because it 
seeks, inter alia, notice of procedural changes in the Administrative Guide regarding the 
terms and conditions of nonunit members and because the proposed notice 
requirement does not include an exception for emergency situations. The ALJ also 
rejected the PBA's contention that the proposal was converted under Cohoes based on 
45
 The PBA's reliance on Croton Police Assn, 16 PERB 1J3007 (1983) is 
misplaced because the proposal in that case was unrelated to establishing the 
criteria for sick leave abuse. 
46
 Pearl River Union Free Sch Dist, 11 PERB fi3085 (1978); City of Rochester, 12 
PERB H3010 (1979); CSEA, Inc., Niagara Chapter, 14 PERB 1J3049 (1981); City 
of Oneida, 15 PERB 3096 (1982); Schenectady PBA, 21 PERB H3022 (1988); 
J PBA of the City of White Plains, Inc., 35 PERB fl3051 (2000); Poughkeepsie Prof 
Fire Fighters'Assn, Local 596, IAFF, 33 PERB 1J3029 (2000). 
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the information exchange provision contained in the expired agreement. 47 
We agree with the ALJ that the proposal is nonmandatory for the reasons cited 
by the ALJ. Furthermore, we find, as the ALJ did, that the proposal is not a mandatory 
subject under Cohoes. The proposal imposes new obligations on the City to provide 
advance notification to the PBA regarding policies and procedures contained in the 
Administrative Guide. Therefore, it is not reasonably related to the specific language in 
the expired agreement regarding information exchange between the parties. 
Finally, we address the City's exceptions to the ALJ finding that the PBA's 
premium pay proposal is a mandatory subject of bargaining. The PBA's proposal 
states: 
Premium for Lack of Negotiable Disciplinary Procedural 
Protections 
The City will be obligated to pay annually a premium equal to 
10% of salary at basic maximum to each officer in 
recognition of the fact that PBA members are employed in a 
jurisdiction in which the Courts have found that the power to 
limit fundamental disciplinary procedural protections rests 
entirely with the Police Commissioner. The premium shall be 
considered wage compensation and as a part of base salary 
for purposes of the calculation of both overtime and night 
shift differential, and shall increase on in the same 
percentage as all future wage increases. 
The ALJ determined that the demand was a mandatory subject of bargaining 
because the essential nature of the demand is for increased compensation. Relying on 
Article XVI (5) of the expired agreement provides: 
The Department will provide the Union with a copy of all Orders, Department 
Bulletins, "Open Door" issues, and press releases. The details of the delivery 
shall be worked out between the parties. 
48
 Town of Yorktown PBA, Inc., supra, note 43 at 3041. 
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the Board's decision in Fulton Fire Fighters Association, Local 3063, IAFF,49 the ALJ 
concluded that the proposal was mandatory. We agree. 
Contrary to the City's exceptions, the proposal does not seek increased 
compensation as a penalty for when work is not performed.50 Rather, it would provide 
compensation that is directly related to the working conditions of the PBA 
membership.51 
Finally, we reject the City's assertion that the proposal is a prohibited subject of 
bargaining based on the holding in Patrolmen's Benevolent Association v New York 
State Public Employment Relations Board.52 In that case, the Court of Appeals ruled 
that the City's police disciplinary procedure was a prohibited subject. The Court's 
decision can not be reasonably interpreted to prohibit negotiations regarding a proposal 
for an increase in the level of compensation for PBA members in consideration for the 
impact of the City's unilateral right to set disciplinary procedures.53 
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the following three proposals were 
properly submitted to interest arbitration by the PBA: bullet-resistant vests, work 
4930PERB H3012 (1997). 
50
 Lynbrook PBA, 10 PERB 1J3067 (1977). 
51
 Town of Haverstraw, 12 PERB P064 (1978), confirmed sub nom, Town of 
Haverstraw v PERB, 12 PERB fl7007 (Rockland County Sup Ct 1979), affd, 75 
AD2d 874,13 PERB 7006 (2d Dept 1980); Fulton Fire Fighters Assn, supra, note 
49 at 3025; Village of Spring Valley 14 PERB 1J3010 at 3017 (1981). 
52 Supra. 
53
 The narrowness of the decision was exemplified by the Court's reaffirmation 
that police discipline can be a mandatory subject when police officers are subject 
to Civil Service Law §§75 and 76. Supra, note 3 at 573. See also, Auburn Police 
Local195: Council 82 v Helsby, 91 Misc2d 909; 10 PERB 1J7016 (1977), affd, 62 
AD2d 12, 11 PERB 1J7003 (3d Dept 1978), affd, 46 NY2d 1034, 12 PERB 1J7006 
(1979). 
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schedule, safety and health maintenance and premium pay for the lack of negotiable 
disciplinary procedures. The PBA's other demands, attainment of safe staffing levels, 
chronic sick program and contract maintenance are not mandatory subjects of 
negotiation and were not properly submitted to interest arbitration. 
DATED: August 29, 2007 
Albany, New York 
Robert S. Hlte, Member 
) 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
YONKERS FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5712 
THE CHARTER SCHOOL OF EDUCATIONAL 
EXCELLENCE, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, 
AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees of the 
above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective negotiations and 
the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5712 
Included: All full-time Teachers, Teaching Assistants and those long term 
Substitute Teachers who are employed more than 95 consecutive 
working days except that approved personal illness and/or 
approved absences of not more than 8 days will not be considered 
a break in consecutive workdays. 
ExcludedL Principals, AsMstan^^^^ 
Workers, Teacher Aides, Clerical Personnel and Security 
Personnel and all others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the Yonkers Federation of Teachers, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO. 
The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising 
thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel either party to 
agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: August 29, 20007 
Albany, New York 
Robert SC Rite, Member 
